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SECURIT Y
Securing the 
ZigBee Protocol 
in the Smart Grid
F ormal analysis of security protocols can demonstrate the success or failure of known attack patterns. 
However, Jean Paul Degabriele and 
his colleagues pointed out that 
such analysis is typically reactive—
occurring only after an attack on a 
protocol implementation’s weakness 
(“Provable Security in the Real 
World,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 
9, no. 3, 2011, pp. 33-41). 
Provable security has limitations, 
but when conducted concurrently 
with security protocol development— 
and effectively communicated to the 
protocol designers and system devel-
opers—formal analysis provides 
useful information for detecting and 
removing potential attack vectors 
during the design process, so that 
history won’t repeat itself.
What happens when history 
repeats itself? Degabriele and his 
colleagues used the SSL/TLS record 
protocol as an example. When reac-
tive formal analyses confirmed that 
the protocol had exploitable vulnera-
bilities, the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) adopted “a pragmatic but 
unproven fix … reflecting the con-
straints and compatibility issues the 
IETF community faces when chang-
ing such a significant protocol.” 
The design-implement-fix process 
is sufficient for previously unknown 
attack vectors. However, engineers 
should use established knowledge, 
such as known attack patterns, 
in the analysis of security proto-
cols prior to their acceptance and 
implementation. 
We conducted a formal analysis of 
the recently developed IEEE 802.15.4 
ZigBee protocol, ZigBee Alliance 
(“ZigBee Smart Energy Profile Specifi-
cation,” ZigBee Document 075356r15, 
1 Dec. 2008) using the Failures-
Divergence Refinement (FDR) model 
checker and its Casper interface (G. 
Lowe et al., “Casper: A Compiler for 
the Analysis of Security Protocols, 
User Manual and Tutorial,” 28 Sept. 
2009; www.cs.ox.ac.uk/gavin.lowe/
Security/Casper/manual.pdf) and the 
Avispa model checker (“Automated 
Validation of Internet Security Pro-
tocols and Specifications”; www.
avispa-project.org). 
The ZigBee protocol supports wire-
less transmission of measurement 
data from end points (meters track-
ing electricity use) to utility vehicles, 
which in turn provide the data to 
the power-distribution companies’ 
central offices. It’s also used widely 
in medical devices and home auto-
mation. Our analysis indicated that 
the protocol is vulnerable to multiple 
authentication attack types. 
ASSESSING ZIGBEE’S 
TRUSTWORTHINESS
We began our formal protocol 
analysis by translating the natu-
Anthony Patrick Melaragno, Damindra 
Bandara, and Duminda Wijesekera
George Mason University
James Bret Michael
Naval Postgraduate School
The design-implement-fix process is sufficient for previously 
unknown attack vectors. However, engineers should use 
established knowledge, such as known attack patterns, in the 
analysis of security protocols prior to their acceptance and 
implementation.
 APRIL 2012 93
the join operation challenging;
•	 our protocol specification was 
complex—we faced the challenge 
of specifying a protocol within a 
protocol, specifically the ZigBee 
specification’s key establishment 
cluster; and
•	 we couldn’t address the com-
posit ion problem ,  wherein 
connecting two systems that are 
secure in isolation might create 
a composite system that leaks 
information.
The current implementation of the 
ZigBee protocol’s SED join process 
illustrates a device trying to connect 
to the ZigBee network. Figure 1 shows 
this process and the corresponding 
Avispa attack trace. 
The energy service provider (ESP) 
trust authority uses the ZigBee key 
ral language protocol specification 
to its equivalent Casper and Avispa 
representations. Through manual 
inspection of these formal models, 
we recognized a well-known security 
flaw in the part of the protocol where 
smart-grid-enabled sensors join the 
network via the local trust center. 
Recognizing this pattern of inter-
est through manual inspection wasn’t 
a surprise. As Mike Bond and Jolyon 
Clulow noted, “It remains rare that vul-
nerabilities are found purely through 
automated analysis, as most analysts 
are highly-skilled and spot the flaw 
during the process of formal specifi-
cation” (“Extending Security Protocol 
Analysis: New Challenges,” Electronic 
Notes Theoretical Computer Science, 
vol. 125, no. 1, 2005, pp. 13-24).
We modeled a smart energy device 
(SED) joining the ZigBee network. We 
provided the simulated attackers with 
knowledge of the default key, which 
we showed was present in other 
variants of the ZigBee protocol.
 The results obtained using Casper 
were the same as those produced by 
Avispa: the protocol specification 
exposed the default key to attackers, 
which allowed traditional Dolev-Yao 
attackers to exploit and expose fur-
ther information—a violation of the 
secrecy and authentication security 
objectives. 
We also found that
•	 it wasn’t necessary to model 
elliptical key generation as the 
National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) guidelines 
specify because the analysis is 
independent of key generation;
•	 the default key’s exposure during 
the service-discovery process 
was the critical point of failure;
•	 the natural language specifica-
tion contained a lot of ambiguity, 
and we needed to refer to other 
sections while examining the 
document to determine, for 
instance, that the devices use 
elliptic curve cryptography, 
which made accurately modeling 
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Figure 1. Current ZigBee protocol and attack trace. (a) Join sequence diagram, and 
(b) corresponding Avispa attack trace.
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protocol analyses and other forms of 
computer-assisted formal verifica-
tion and validation, for instance, on 
security requirements themselves 
(J.B. Michael et al., “Verifi cation and 
Validation for Trustworthy Software 
Systems,” IEEE Software, vol. 28, no. 
6, 2011, pp. 86-92). Otherwise, the 
electric power and healthcare indus-
tries will likely carry on the legacy of 
relying on “pragmatic but unproven 
fi xes,” such as adding security con-
trols but not really understanding the 
security protocols’ fl aws, resulting in 
economic losses and a lack of stake-
holder trust in the smart grid. 
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timed weak agreements were violated 
when authenticating the SED to the 
ESP. Adding steps to the protocol can 
restore authentication objectives. 
However, these steps place more trust 
in the ESP, and the timing require-
ment might need to be adjusted to 
account for the time needed to estab-
lish secure connections between an 
ESP and multiple SEDs. 
We must examine additional secu-
rity objectives, such as preventing 
an imposter SED from successfully 
impersonating or influencing the 
ESP. This would deter attackers 
whose capabilities go beyond those 
of traditional Dolev-Yao attackers. 
Also, any additional trust verifica-
tion steps requiring more time in 
negotiation result in a protocol that 
ultimately executes more slowly than 
anticipated.
S tandardized protocols are necessary to enable interop-erability among sensors, 
controllers, and other devices that 
comprise the smart grid infra-
structure (“NIST Framework and 
Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoper-
ability Standards, Release 1.0,” NIST 
Special Publication 1108, National 
Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, Jan. 2010; www.nist.gov/public_
affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid_
interoperability_final.pdf). In the US, 
NIST is leading this effort. 
There’s heightened awareness in 
the public and private sectors of the 
defi ciencies in critical infrastructure, 
as evidenced by a recent article in The 
Washington Post in which Gregory 
Friedman, inspector general of the 
US Department of Energy, stated that 
the department’s auditors found fl aws 
in the security analyses, plans, and 
controls in many federally funded 
smart grid projects conducted by the 
utility companies (L. Rein, “Smart 
Grid Audit Flags Cybersecurity,” 
8 Feb. 2012, p. A17). NIST and other 
organizations should encourage and 
guide security protocol and smart 
grid developers in employing formal 
establishment cluster algorithm 
and exchanges nonces necessary to 
generate symmetric keys utilizing 
an elliptical curve. Casper detected 
a discrepancy in the authentication 
between the SED and the ESP, making 
the protocol vulnerable to timing 
attacks. The seclist.org community, 
specifi cally Wireshark, has success-
fully detected and decoded ZigBee’s 
default key using a common board. 
MAKING ZIGBEE 
TRUSTWORTHY
We’re currently evaluating the 
technical merits of modifying the 
protocol to make it more robust to 
attack. For example, we need to 
ensure that if data is exposed in 
transit, the impact to overall security 
is minimal. 
The formal model checker lets us 
check for security properties such 
as different versions of agreements 
between an ESP and various SEDs. In 
our evaluation of ZigBee, the agree-
ment properties of authentication and 
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